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“counter-majoritarian dilemma”). However, the author rejects the recent critique by some 
scholars that the German Federal Constitutional Court structurally exceeds its powers vis-
à-vis the German Parliament and that there is a permanent judicial overreach. On the 
contrary, the author argues that Constitutional Courts do not have sufficient tools to 
counter a democratic backsliding, i.e. the incremental erosion of democracy. Since the 
author considers democratic backsliding to be a greater and more acute threat to 
democracy than judicial overreach, he presents the view that the guarantee of the 
essential content of a right delineates the minimum of a fundamental right in a democratic 
society. This view is explained using freedom of expression as example. 
Keywords: German Constitution, Grundgesetz, Constitutional comparison, Essential 
content of a right, Freedom of expression, Separation of powers, Democratic 
backsliding, Counter-majoritarian dilemma, Constitutional courts, Democracy, 




Constitutional democracy is generally associated with the judicial review of legislative 
and executive action against the duty to respect, and sometimes even promote, 
fundamental human rights. This model of democracy is under threat from democratic 
backsliding in development States;1 marked by the gradual erosion of fundamental 
rights, on the one hand, and an attack on the power of so-called “elitist” courts to review 
legislation produced by “popular legislative” assemblies, on the other . Several 
constitutional scholars have identified this threat in post-apartheid South Africa and 
have implored the Constitutional Court to manage the threat by strategically 
compromising the protection of rights (Roux)2, judiciously avoiding controversial 
human rights disputes (Currie),3 or deferring to and building the capacity of other 
constitutional institutions (Fowkes).4 Critics of these approaches to judicial review, 
which all avoid substantive human rights doctrine when it appears to be most needed, 
have lamented South Africa’s “amazing vanishing Bill of Rights” in the hands of the 
 
* Reworked version of a paper presented at the Third Biannual German-South African Dialogue on 
Democracy: The Preconditions of Democracy held at the University of the Western Cape on 26 February 
2016. 
1 Gardbaum S “Are strong constitutional courts always a good thing for new democracies?” (2014) 53 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 285; Tushnet M “New forms of judicial review and the 
persistence of rights-and-democracy-based worries” (2003) 38 Wake Forest Law Review 813.  
2 Roux T “Principle and pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa” (2009) 7 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 106; Roux T The politics of principle: the first South African Constitutional 
Court, 1995-2005 Cambridge : Cambridge University Press  (2013) at 27. 
3 Currie I “Judicious avoidance” (1999) 15 SAJHR 138. 
4 Fowkes J Building the constitution. The practice of constitutional interpretation in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2017) at 15. 
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Constitutional Court (Woolman).5 The simmering debate among academics about the 
proper place of the Constitutional Court in a development State recently erupted among 
the judges of the Court itself, with Chief Justice Mogoeng accusing the majority of the 
Court of a “textbook case of judicial overreach – a constitutionally impermissible 
intrusion by the Judiciary into the exclusive domain of Parliament”.6  
Accusations of judicial overreach and the danger of democratic backsliding are not 
limited to developing democracies. A global rise in populist politics has placed human 
rights and constitutional courts under pressure even in established democracies around 
the world. It is also not a new phenomenon. Germany experienced a nearly total 
backslide from Weimar democracy to Nazi totalitarianism during the first half of the 
20th century. The German Constitution or Basic Law,7 which restored democracy in 
1949, was specifically designed to prevent a similar backslide from occurring again. In 
this article I explore what the German response to the threat of democratic backsliding 
can contribute to the debate about the threat in South Africa.  
 The discussion takes place against the background of an ongoing engagement 
between German and South African scholars.8 In February 2016, a third biannual 
German-South African dialogue on democracy was held at the University of the Western 
Cape. The aim of the one-day conference was to analyse the foundations of democracy 
and the prerequisites required to make a constitutional democracy work. One aspect 
discussed was the relationship between democracy and fundamental rights.  
South Africa introduced a Constitutional Court for the first time 25 years ago when 
the interim Constitution came into force on 27 April 1994.9 A second novelty of the 
interim Constitution was the introduction of a constitutional doctrine known as the 
essential content of a right. The interim Constitution stated that the limitation of a right 
in the Bill of Rights was only permissible if the limitation did not “negate the essential 
 
5 Woolman S “The amazing vanishing Bill of Rights” (2007) 124 SALJ 762. 
6 Mogoeng CJ in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2018 (2) SA 571 (CC) at 
para 223. See also the response by Froneman J at para 219: “Conceptually it is difficult to appreciate how 
the interpretation and application of a provision in the Constitution by a court may amount to judicial 
overreach. The Constitution itself mandates courts to interpret and enforce its provisions. The discharge 
of this judicial function cannot amount to overreach whether one agrees or disagrees with a judgment 
that construes and applies the Constitution in a particular way.” 
7 The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) is the German Constitution. It was adopted on 23 May 1949 and 
entered into force the following day, BGBl. I, 1. It was last amended on 28 March 2019, BGBl. I, 404. An 
English translation can be found on the internet at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/ 
(accessed 12 August 2019).  
8 See for the links between South African and German constitutional law Davis DM “Constitutional 
borrowing: the influence of legal culture and local history in the reconstitution of comparative influence: 
the South African experience” (2003) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 181 at 186 seq; Du 
Plessis L “German Verfassungsrecht under the Southern Cross” in Hufen F (ed) Verfassungen zwischen 
Recht und Politik. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag für Hans-Peter Schneider (2008) 524; Rautenbach C & du 
Plessis L “In the name of comparative constitutional jurisprudence: the consideration of German 
precedents by South African Constitutional Court judges” (2013) 8 German Law Journal 1539. 
9 Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (interim Constitution). 
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content of the right”.10 However, the doctrine was abandoned soon thereafter  and not 
incorporated into the final Constitution.11 The Constitutional Court, on the contrary, was 
retained under the final Constitution and is today a globally respected institution. In 
fact, the Court is so activist that some critics fear judicial overreach.12 The problem of a 
constitutional court with the power to invalidate an Act adopted by a parliamentary 
majority representing the people, is usually described as a  “counter - majoritarian 
difficulty”.13 This article deals with this difficulty and the general question of how 
democracy and fundamental rights interact. As mentioned above, this problem is 
analysed from the perspective of democratic backsliding using a comparative 
perspective including Germany and South Africa.   
The article is structured as follows. First, the relationship between democracy and 
fundamental rights is analysed from a conceptual perspective (part 2). It is argued that 
the two concepts are interrelated and interdependent. Here, it is important to stress 
that democracy is more than the mere will of the majority. Secondly, the relationship 
between democracy and fundamental rights is discussed from an institutional 
perspective (part 4). The question is posed whether, and if so how, the potential tension 
between Parliament and the Constitutional Court could be brought into balance. I reject 
the recent critique by some scholars that the German Federal Constitutional Court 
structurally exceeds its powers vis-à-vis the German Parliament and that there is a 
permanent judicial overreach. The only promising solution to prevent a judicial 
overreach by the Constitutional Court, to the detriment of Parliament, is judicial self-
restraint. Former South African Constitutional Court judge, Albie Sachs, has challenged 
constitutional scholars to develop “a theory of when” (instead of whether) the 
Constitutional Court may exercise a stricter review.14 However, sometimes the judicial 
review of rights eroding legislation is not strict enough. In fact, constitutional courts do 
not have sufficient tools to counter a democratic backsliding or the incremental erosion 
of democratic values. Therefore, this article finally aims to determine what minimum 
fundamental rights must exist if a State is to be considered democratic at all (part 5).  
I argue that the guarantee of the essential content of a right stipulated by section 
19(2) of the German Basic Law delineates the minimum of a fundamental right. Even 
though the SA Constitution has not adopted the concept of the essential content of a 
right, a similar debate exists in South Africa. Here the question arises whether at least 
 
10 Section 33(1)(b) of the interim Constitution stated: “The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be 
limited by law of general application, provided that such limitation […] shall not negate the essential 
content of the right in question.” 
11 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (SA Constitution). 
12 Mogoeng CJ in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2018 (2) SA 571 (CC) at 
para 223. 
13 De Vos P & Freedman W South African constitutional law in context Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2014) at 72–77. 
14 Sachs J “Book reviews” (2001) 51 University of Toronto Law Journal 87 at 90. 
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socio-economic rights have a minimum content.15 The German debate about the 
essential content of a right can therefore still be fruitful within the South African 
context, at least with regard to socio-economic rights. From the German perspective, it 
is argued that the minimum content of a right is useful in establishing a positive 
understanding of the constitution to determine whether legislative measures set in 
motion a process of democratic backsliding. 
In this article, the terms “fundamental rights” or “fundamental liberties” will be 
used to describe the individual rights of persons against the State, as they are enshrined 
in the Bills of Rights in many modern constitutions.16 Democracy is understood as the 
form of government set out in the Constitutions of South Africa and Germany 
,respectively. This contribution will not follow a philosophical or political 
understanding of democracy, but a legal one.    
2 DEMOCRACY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A CONCEPTUAL TENSION  
The two core elements of a legal, as opposed to a political, understanding of democracy 
are the majority principle,17 and periodical elections (free, fair, equal, general and 
direct).18 Democracy, understood in this fashion, is based on and requires freedoms and 
liberties as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. The following quote from an early decision of 
the German Federal Constitutional Court illustrates that the Court has linked democracy 
and fundamental rights from the beginning of its jurisprudence:19  
“The freedom of expression is  one of the most direct expressions of a human 
personality within a society, one of the loftiest rights that exist (‘un des droits 
les plus précieux de l'homme’ pursuant to section 11 of the French Declaration 
of Human and Civic Rights of 1789).  
It is a basic requirement of any free and democratic society. This is because this 
freedom allows a continual intellectual exchange, a battle of opinions, which is the 
life-giving element of any free and democratic society … The freedom of expression 
 
15 See Brickhill J & Ferreira N “Socio-economic rights” in Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The Bill of Rights 
Handbook 6th ed Cape Town: Juta (2013) at 574–584; Liebenberg S “Socio-economic rights: revisiting 
the reasonableness review/minimum core debate” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional 
Conversations 303.  
16 As in ss 7–39 of the SA Constitution and ss 1–19 of the German Basic Law. See in more detail part 5.3 
below . 
17 Section 53(1)(c) of the SA Constitution; s 42(2) sentence 1 of the German Basic Law: “Decisions of the 
Bundestag shall require a majority of the votes cast unless this Basic Law otherwise provides.” 
18 Section 53(1)(c) of the SA Constitution; s 38(1) of the German Basic Law: “Members of the German 
Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections. They shall be 
representatives of the whole people, not bound by orders or instructions, and responsible only to their 
conscience.” 
19 BVerfGE 7, 198 at 208. Also in this sense Badura P Staatsrecht 7th ed Munich: CH Beck (2018) at D para 
7. 
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is in a certain sense the foundation of any kind of freedom ‘the matrix, the 
indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom’ (Cardozo).”20 
The South African Constitutional Court has adopted the same position in its rulings. 
In Justice O’Reagan’s words: 
“Freedom of expression lies at the heart of a democracy. It is valuable for many 
reasons, including its instrumental function as a guarantor of democracy, its 
implicit recognition and protection of the moral agency of individuals in our 
society and its facilitation of the search for truth by individuals and society 
generally. The Constitution recognises that individuals in our society need to 
be able to hear, form and express opinions and views freely on a wide range of 
matters.”21 
This does not come as a surprise. Without the right to vote,22 freedom of expression,23 
and freedom of assembly,24 a community can hardly be said to be living under a 
democratic order. Just as fundamental rights allow individuals self-determination, a 
democratic State allows self-determination on a collective level.25 The SA Constitution 
links democracy and fundamental rights at least three times: from section 7(1) we learn 
that the Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy and that it affirms the democratic 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom; section 36(1) states that limitations of a 
right must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society ; and finally 
section 39(1)(a) requires that the interpretation of a right must promote the values that 
underlie a democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
Similarly, the German Basic Law uses the term “free and democratic basic order”26 
more than once, implying that freedom and democracy belong together.27 Even more 
 
20 BVerfGE 7, 198 at 208. 
21 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence [1999] ZACC 7; 1999 (6) BCLR 615 at 622 
(CC). See also Botha H “Fundamental rights and democratic contestation: reflections on freedom of 
assembly in an unequal society” (2017) 21 LDD at 221.  
22 Sections 19(2) and (3) of the SA Constitution; s 38(1), sentence 1 of the German Basic Law. 
23 Section 16(1) of the SA Constitution; s 5(1) sentence 1 of the German Basic Law: “Every person shall 
have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures, and to 
inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom 
of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.” 
24 Section 17 of the SA Constitution; s 8 of the German Basic Law: “(1) All Germans shall have the right to 
assemble peacefully and unarmed without prior notification or permission. (2) In the case of outdoor 
assemblies, this right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law.” 
25 Steiger D “L’Ètat, c’est moi! L’Ètat, c’est nous! Legitimation von Staatsgewalt durch individuelle und 
kollektive Selbstbestimmung” in Heschl et al (eds) L’Ètat, c’est quoi? Staatsgewalt im Wandel Baden-
Baden: Nomos (2015) 79 at 83–85. 
26 “Freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung” such as in s 11(2): “This right may be restricted only by or 
pursuant to a law, and only in cases in which the absence of adequate means of support would result in 
a particular burden for the community, or in which such restriction is necessary to avert an imminent 
danger to the existence or the free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, to combat the 
danger of an epidemic, to respond to a grave accident or natural disaster, to protect young persons from 
serious neglect, or to prevent crime.” Section 18 sentence 1: “Whoever abuses the freedom of 
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striking, limitations to freedoms acknowledged by the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR),28 of which Germany is a member, are only permitted in cases where it is 
“necessary in a democratic society”.29 In other words, the wording of both section 36 of 
the SA Constitution and the ECHR suggest that certain legal limitations to rights are 
undemocratic, even though the limiting law was passed by the will of a majority. A 
preliminary answer to the question raised in the title of this article would therefore be 
that, in both the South African and German-European conceptions, democracy and 
fundamental rights march together in line.  
However, even if democracy presupposes fundamental rights,30 the belief that more 
fundamental rights inevitably mean more democracy is only true up to a certain point. 
Fundamental rights, understood as individual rights to be defended against the State, 
can work against the will of the majority and  thus be seen as undemocratic from a 
majoritarian perspective.31 The German Federal Constitutional Court has, for example, 
decided that  gatherings that may shock the majority of the people but do not violate 
penal provisions cannot be banned only because they are provocative.32 Freedom of 
assembly is a right that protects the majority as well as the minority. The minority is not 
obliged to exercise freedom of assembly in a way that pleases the majority. In order to 
gain attention it is allowed to provoke. The fundamental right of freedom of assembly 
limits the legislator in its law-making capacity.  
In addition, fundamental rights may also be used to undermine democracy as a 
form of government. This is the case especially with political rights, such as, the freedom 
 
expression, in particular the freedom of the press (paragraph (1) of section 5), the freedom of teaching 
(paragraph (3) of section 5), the freedom of assembly (section 8), the freedom of association (section 
9), the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications (section 10), the rights of property 
(section 14), or the right of asylum (section 16a) in order to combat the free democratic basic order 
shall forfeit these basic rights.” Section 21(2) sentence 1: “Parties that, by reason of their aims or the 
behaviour of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to 
endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional.” 
27 See BVerfGE 5, 85 at 134–140; BVerfGE 144, 20 at 195–197. 
28 Available at https://echr.coe.int/pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts&c= (accessed 10 September 2019). 
29 Section10(2) ECHR: “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection 
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, 
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” Section 11(2) ECHR: “No restrictions 
shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the 
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the 
State.”  
30 See in more detail part 5 below. 
31 Schmitt C Der Hüter der Verfassung 4th ed Berlin: Duncker & Humblot (1996) at 155 & 159. 
32 BVerfGE 111, 147 seq. 
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of expression or the freedom of assembly. Both these rights can  be used to fight against 
democracy, as populist right-wing parties, for example, have tried to do time and again 
in Germany. In order to prevent the misuse of fundamental rights against democracy, 
the German Basic Law is designed as a defensive or militant democracy.33 This concept 
means that the German Constitution includes provisions intended to protect the 
Constitution. These provisions allow for a greater limitation of fundamental rights and 
freedoms in extraordinary circumstances when democracy is threatened. This includes 
the forfeiture of fundamental rights ,such as, freedom of assembly and freedom of 
expression,34 and the ability to ban political parties.35 The concept of defensive 
democracy resulted from the experience of democratic backsliding and of extreme 
injustice under the Nazi regime and seeks to prevent the recurrence of past injuries.36  
While fundamental rights may be used to threaten democracy as explained above, 
democracy may also be used to threaten fundamental rights. Majority rule is a core 
element of democracy and is often equated by some, especially populist movements, 
with majority rule. Legislative majorities can use their democratic power to curb the 
rights of minorities. The ban on minarets,37 or the wearing of a full-body veil in public,38 
are two recent examples. Currently, in Europe tendencies to limit the rights of various 
minorities in the name of “the people” can be observed in many countries, including 
Poland39 and Hungary,40 two Member States of the European Union. The limitation of 
individual rights, often coupled with the reduction of judicial remedies, is justified by 
the claim that the individuals or minorities in question are exercising their rights in an 
undemocratic manner, against the best interests of “the people”. In Germany, a right 
wing party expressly states in its party manifesto that Islam does not belong in 
 
33 “Wehrhafte Demokratie“; see Schneider J-P “Art. 8” in Beck OK Grundgesetz 41st ed Munich: CH Beck 
(2019) para 59.  
34 In accordance with s 18 GG. 
35 In accordance with s 21(2) GG. 
36 BVerfGE 144, 20 at 195. Even though the South African Constitution is also a “never again” Constitution, 
it does not have this feature, but Chapter 9 provides for institutions to protect democracy. The German 
Constitution does not have this concept. 
37 See Hafid Ouardiri v Switzerland, ECtHR (2012) Neue Zeitschrift fur Verwaltungsrecht (NVwZ) 289 seq. 
38 See SAS v France, ECtHR (2014) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2925 seq with annotation by 
Hochhuth M; Finke J “Warum das ‘Burka-Verbot’ gegen die EMRK verstößt” (2010) NVwZ 1127 seq; 
Beaucamp G & Beaucamp J “In dubio pro libertate” (2015) Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (DÖV) 174 seq; 
Grabenwarter C & Struth K “Das französische Verbot der Vollverschleierung - Absolutes Verbot der 
Gesichtsverhüllung zur Wahrung der ‘Minimalanforderungen des Lebens in einer Gesellschaft’?” (2015) 
Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (EuGRZ) 1 seq. 
39 See Starski P “Poland at Crossroads – The Constitutional Tragedy Continues … Part I”, available at 
https://www.juwiss.de/1-2016/ (accessed 29 May 2016) and “The Constitutional Tragedy Continues … 
Part II” available at https://www.juwiss.de/3-2016/ (accessed 29 May 2016). 
40 Fournier T “From rhetoric to action, a constitutional analysis of populism” (2019) 20(3) German Law 
Journal 362 at 367 – 375. 
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Germany.41 As a consequence, some party representatives suggest that Muslims should 
not be allowed to invoke the freedom of religion.  
The relationship between fundamental rights and democracy is therefore more 
complicated than it may appear at first glance. On the one hand, democracy seems to 
depend on the protection of rights; on the other, the protection of rights can undermine 
democracy while democracy can undermine the protection of rights. Considering the 
potential conflicts between the two constitutional values, the next part analyses 
whether, and if so how, both values can be reconciled in case of conflict.                                
3 RECONCILING DEMOCRACY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS  
One way of solving a potential conflict between democracy and fundamental rights is to 
establish a hierarchical order or ranking between them, with either democracy or 
fundamental rights as the more important value. However, no express or implied 
relationship of this kind can be found in the German Basic Law. Both principles have the 
same priority under the Constitution. In the absence of a hierarchical relationship (see 
part 3.1 below), the two values must be brought into harmony with as little friction as 
possible (see part 3.2 below).  
3.1 Hierarchy  
There is no evidence in the German Basic Law that fundamental rights are subordinate 
to the democratic principle (see part 3.1.1 below), or that fundamental rights are given 
precedence over democracy (see part 3.1.2 below). 
3.1.1 Democratic-functional theories of fundamental rights  
The principle of democracy would have logical priority if the exercise of fundamental 
rights was only allowed in ways that promote democracy. This is the view held by what 
is known as the democratic-functional theory of fundamental rights.42 The German 
Federal Constitutional Court has not endorsed a particular theory of fundamental rights, 
such as the democratic-functional theory. Rather, depending on the fundamental right 
and the particulars of the case in question, the Court has pragmatically applied a variety 
of approaches.43 In the case of fundamental rights with a political dimension, such as, 
the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court has emphasised how important the exercise of the fundamental 
rights is to a democratic State.44 Moreover, individual elements of some fundamental 
rights have occasionally been interpreted after considering the significance of that 
fundamental right in a democratic State. One of the rare examples of this is the Love 
 
41 AfD, “Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland” available at  
https://www.afd.de/grundsatzprogramm/ (accessed 15 August 2019). 
42 See Böckenförde EW “Grundrechtstheorie und Grundrechtsinterpretation” (1974) NJW 1529 seq; 
Mahlmann M “Grundrechtstheorien in Europa – kulturelle Bestimmtheit und universeller Gehalt” 
(2011) Europarecht (EuR) 469 seq. 
43 In this sense Böckenförde (1974) at 1530. 
44 BVerfGE 7, 198 at 208; BVerfGE 69, 315 at 346 – 347. 
 
  LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 23 (2019) 
 
Page | 308  
 
Parade case, in which the term “assembly” in section 8(1)45 of the German Basic Law 
was defined in relatively narrow terms.46 German courts and legal scholars agree that 
an assembly, as opposed to a crowd, is characterised by a common purpose.47 It is 
disputed whether every purpose (including cultural or sports purposes) is sufficient to 
constitute an assembly, or whether the purpose must have a special connection to the 
public sphere or public interest. The German Federal Constitutional Court adopted the 
narrower view, according to which assemblies are privileged by the Constitution 
because of the benefits of political assemblies for the democratic process.48 On this 
basis, the Court denied constitutional protection to a Love Parade, essentially a techno 
party, and the counter-demonstration, essentially another techno party. 
However, even in such cases, the interpretation of fundamental rights is not viewed 
exclusively within the context of their contribution to the principle of democracy. This 
would not be consistent with the nature and historical origins of fundamental rights as 
individual rights, as has continually been emphasised by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court in its rulings. In addition, a democratic-functional theory of 
fundamental rights would require an assessment of the contribution each right makes 
to democracy. The contribution made by expressions of opinion or assemblies, would 
have to be evaluated in terms of its effect on the democratic process and public opinion. 
Apart from the impracticability of such an approach, this approach would require, and 
thus allow the authorities to assess and evaluate, the value of the opinions expressed. 
This would lead to an oversight or censorship of opinions by the State; something not 
desirable in a democracy where  public opinions should be developed by the people and 
not imposed by the government.  
3.1.2 A right to democracy? 
The previous paragraph established that the fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights are 
not inferior and subservient to the value of democracy. However, democracy is also not 
subsidiary to fundamental rights, in the sense that democracy is part of, or merely a 
simple consequence of, fundamental rights. 
It is true that the sovereignty of the people49 can be understood as a right of the 
individual to participate and have a voice in the political process.50 However, the 
principle of people’s sovereignty is too abstract from which to deduce concrete legal 
 
45 For the text of the provision see the translation above. 
46 BVerfG (2001) NJW 2459 at 2460. 
47 BVerfG (2001) NJW 2459 at 2460; Depenheuer O “Art 8” in Maunz/Dürig (eds) Grundgesetz-
Kommentar, Munich: CH Beck (2006) para 44.  
48 BVerfG (2001) NJW 2459 at 2460. In South Africa, legal scholars generally assume that all assemblies 
are protected, even concerts or soccer matches, De Vos & Freedman (2014) at 553.  
49 Preamble & s 42(3) of the SA Constitution; s 20(2) of the German Basic Law: “All state authority is 
derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and 
through specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies.” 
50 Kielmansegg P “Demokratiebegründung zwischen Menschenrechten und Volkssouveränität” in 
Schwartländer J (ed) Menschenrechte und Demokratie Kehl: Engel (1981) 99 seq. 
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consequences, such as, the voting system or the term of the legislative period. The 
relevant provisions on democracy in the German Basic Law are not formulated as 
individual rights, but as provisions determining the structure of the State. The only 
individual right expressly granted with respect to democracy is the right to participate 
in elections in accordance with section 38(1) of the German Basic Law. This provision is 
more specific than a general right to democracy would be. The SA Constitution also 
grants political rights, such as in section 19 of the SA Constitution, on the one hand, and 
provides for democratic institutions,51 with law-making procedures,52 on the other. A 
general right to democracy would level these distinctions. Therefore, it cannot be 
argued that democracy is subordinate to fundamental rights.  
3.2 Reciprocity  
If the tension between fundamental rights and democracy cannot be resolved by 
establishing a hierarchical relationship between these two values, they must be aligned 
by other means. This requires a closer conceptual analysis of each term. 
3.2.1 Democracy 
To reconcile fundamental rights and democracy, it is crucial not to view democracy 
simply as the will of the majority.53 The protection of the rights of minorities is just as 
much a part of the principle of democracy; democracy means that a minority must have 
the opportunity to become the majority.54 The possibility of a change in the majority is 
part of the democratic ethos.55 The protection of minorities is closely related to the 
principle of temporary rule,56 which is also an essential feature of democracy. 
Temporary rule means that government offices are awarded only for a certain term of 
pre-determined duration. The limits on public office linked to limited election periods, 
which require that public officials must be elected at regular intervals in general, direct, 
free, equal and secret elections,57 make a peaceful change in the governmental majority 
possible. Thus, in German constitutional law, the principle of democracy includes within 
itself several sub-principles, which flank and counterbalance the majority principle.58  
This conception of democracy as a cluster of principles provides us with a better 
understanding of the relationship between democracy and human rights. The principle 
 
51 “Parliament” (ss 42 seq of the SA Constitution) or “State Institutions Supporting Constitutional 
Democracy” (ss 181 seq of the SA Constitution). 
52 Sections 73 seq of the SA Constitution. 
53 See Schmitt (1996) at 155 & 159; see also Drossel J-M “Das letzte Wort des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
– Ein undemokratischer Mechanismus?” in Elser D et al Das letzte Wort – Rechtssetzung und 
Rechtskontrolle in der Demokratie Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag (2014) 255 seq. 
54 BVerfGE 5, 85 at 198 seq. 
55 Böckenförde EW “Demokratie als Verfassungsprinzip” in Isensee J & Kirchhof P (eds) Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vol II 3rd ed Heidelberg: CF Müller  (2004) at §24 para 76. 
56 Böckenförde at § 24 para 50. 
57 Section 38(1) of the German Basic Law. 
58 Sachs M in Sachs M (ed) Grundgesetz 8th ed Munich: CH Beck (2018) at Art 20 para 26. 
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of majority rule is only a formal principle. It is silent about the content of the majority 
will. Viewed formally, the mechanical application of the principle of the majority will 
would justify the tyranny of the majority.59 This is not in accordance with a modern 
understanding of democracy. Rather, the rule of the majority is based on the concept of 
equality of voters and a free and open forum of opinions culminating in regular 
elections.60 Democracy can be described as the form of government “of free persons, 
subject to reciprocal recognition of the freedom of the others”.61 
3.2.2 Fundamental rights 
In the German context, the necessary material content of democracy, as opposed to the 
formal principle of majority rule, is provided by a Bill of Fundamental Rights which are 
based on human dignity. In German constitutional law, fundamental rights are not only 
negative liberties in the sense that they limit the law making capacity of the State.62 
They are not only individual rights limiting State power. Fundamental rights, in 
particular freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, secure the free and open 
forum upon which democracy depends. They grant a sphere of privacy where values 
and opinions can freely develop. Only a sphere of freedom allows informed 
participation in the democratic process. Free elections as required by the formal 
principle of democratic will, will only be possible if the citizens who are members of the 
electorate are independent of State will and can build their own opinions in a sphere 
separated from State organs. 
Fundamental rights guarantee more than the mere absence of legal limitations. 
Relying on the German Basic Law, the German Federal Constitutional Court has 
developed and given shape to further dimensions of fundamental rights. Fundamental 
rights require the State to act in favour of the individual person. There is a positive duty 
on the part of the State to protect the fundamental rights of the bearers of the rights.63 
This positive duty is not spelled out explicitly in the German Basic Law, but has been 
interpreted by the German Federal Constitutional Court as implied in the Basic Law. The 
South African Constitution explicitly embraces this fuller conception of rights in section 
7(2): “The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights”. 
The South African Constitutional Court has given effect to this provision by highlighting 
that it not only imposes negative but also positive obligations on the State.64  
 
59 Voßkuhle A “Rechtsstaat und Demokratie” (2018) NJW 3154. 
60 Badura (2018) at D para 8. 
61 Möllers C Demokratie – Zumutungen und Versprechen Berlin: Wagenbach (2008) at 9.13 & 13.17seq. 
62 Hesse K Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 20th ed Heidelberg: CF Müller 
(1999) at para 291. 
63  BVerfGE 39, 1 at 20; BVerfGE 46, 160 at 164. 
64  See for example S v Baloyi 2000 (2) SA 425 (CC) at 11 where s 7(2) read together with s 12 of the SA 
Constitution is interpreted as “obliging the state directly” to protect the right of everyone to be free 
from domestic violence; see also Klug H The Constitution of South Africa: a contextual analysis Oxford: 
Hart Publishing (2010) at 124. 
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However, fundamental rights are also ambiguous in themselves and in their 
formulation. Rights are not absolute but subject to internal qualification and external 
limitation. Section 4 of the French Declaration of Human and Citizens’ Rights of 26 
August 178965 stated that individual freedom means the ability to do anything that does 
not harm anyone else, but added that limitations could be imposed on the exercise of 
fundamental rights by passing a law.66 Fundamental rights and their democratically 
adopted limitations may therefore at times require a careful balancing. This fact is not 
explicitly acknowledged by the German Basic Law but has been developed by legal 
scholars and the German Constitutional Court.67 The South African Constitution 
addresses the limitation of rights explicitly,68 and provides for a more nuanced and 
detailed approach to the tension between fundamental rights and democratic 
legislation.69  
3.3 Preliminary conclusion 
The conceptual analysis of the tension between fundamental rights and democracy has 
revealed the following. Democracy requires and presupposes fundamental rights. 
Democracy is also the form of government which is best suited to protect fundamental 
rights. This is so because the minority has the chance to become the majority and vice 
versa. The two values are interrelated and interdependent. Therefore, any limitation of 
fundamental rights and freedoms must always be based on an action by the democratic 
legislature, the will of the majority. However, legislators are not entirely free. Due to the 
principle of proportionality inherent in fundamental rights,70 they are required to strike 
a suitable balance between public and private interests. To play one off against the 
other would ultimately corrupt them both.  
4 THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT  
The relationship between democracy and fundamental rights is not solely determined 
by the content of constitutional values; it is also determined by the actors (institutions 
envisaged by the constitutions, namely, a parliament and constitutional court) and their 
 
65 Starck C “Grundrechte und Gesetz. Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte” in Sachs M & Siekmann H (eds) Der 
grundrechtsgeprägte Verfassungsstaat. Festschrift für Klaus Stern zum 80. Geburtstag Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot (2012) 197 at 198 – 200. 
66  “La liberté consiste à pouvoir faire tout ce qui ne nuit pas à autrui : ainsi, l'exercice des droits naturels 
de chaque homme n'a de bornes que celles qui assurent aux autres Membres de la Société la jouissance 
de ces mêmes droits. Ces bornes ne peuvent être déterminées que par la Loi“. 
67  Hesse (1999) at para 317 – 320; BVerfGE 142, 74 at 96 – 97 & 101. 
68 Section 36 of the SA Constitution. 
69 See, for example, a description of this process in De Vos & Freedman (2014) at 347. Section 36 of the SA 
Constitution (or s 33 of the interim Constitution) has been applied in numerous cases before the 
Constitutional Court; see for example S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); Ex parte Minister of Safety 
and Security & others: in re S v Walters & another 2002 (4) SA 613(CC). 
70 BVerfGE 19, 342 at 348 – 349.  
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actions. Whether the right balance between democracy and fundamental rights is struck 
will be ultimately decided by the constitutional court. This is so both in South Africa and 
in Germany, where the Constitutions provide for the separation of powers,71 but charge 
a Constitutional Court with interpreting the contents of the Bills of Rights and the value 
of democracy, and thus determine their relationship.72 The two Constitutional Courts 
are charged with reviewing the activities of Parliament, where the democratic majority 
enacts its laws.73 The problem is that Parliament receives its mandate through direct 
democratic elections,74 and thus represents the majority will, whereas the justices of the 
Constitutional Courts are only appointed or elected indirectly.75 The Courts does not 
have a direct mandate to govern and their decisions are marked by a democratic deficit: 
the so-called “counter-majoritarian dilemma”.76  
This term was coined by Bickel and was used to criticise the extensive powers of 
judicial review which the US Supreme Court has acquired since the famous decision in 
Marbury v Madison.77 Since the US Constitution does not provide for  judicial review of 
legislation in clear terms, the debate in the US about the constitutional legitimacy of this 
power is justified to some extent. However, when it comes to modern constitutions, 
such as those of Germany and South Africa, the drafters were aware of the “counter-
majoritarian dilemma” and must be assumed to have resolved the dilemma. One could 
thus argue that the German and South African Constitutional Courts simply apply the 
law when invalidating legislation passed by Parliament, as the Constitutions themselves 
reflect the political will of the majority of “we the people”. However, since constitutions 
are drafted in broad terms and make reference to abstract concepts (such as, freedom, 
equality, dignity), the constitutions as law leave constitutional courts with a large 
margin of discretion. Furthermore, the older a constitution gets, the less convincing it 
becomes that the old constitution reflects the will of the majority of the people more 
 
71 Sections 41(1)(e) - (g) of the SA Constitution, see Parpworth N “The South African Constitutional Court: 
upholding the Rule of Law and the separation of powers” (2017) 61 Journal of African Law, 273 seq;  
    s 20(2) of the German Basic Law: “All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by 
the people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive and judicial 
bodies.” 
72 Section 167 of the SA Constitution; s 93(1)1 of the German Basic Law: “The Federal Constitutional 
Court shall rule on the interpretation of this Basic Law in the event of disputes concerning the extent of 
the rights and duties of a supreme federal body or of other parties vested with rights of their own by 
this Basic Law or by the rules of procedure of a supreme federal body […].” 
73 Sections 167(4)(b) and (5) of the SA Constitution; s 93(1)2 of the German Basic Law: “The Federal 
Constitutional Court shall rule in the event of disagreements or doubts concerning the formal or 
substantive compatibility of federal law or Land law with this Basic Law, or the compatibility of Land 
law with other federal law, on application of the Federal Government, of a Land government, or of one 
fourth of the Members of the Bundestag […].” 
74 Section 46 of the SA Constitution; s 38(1) of the German Basic Law, see text above at n18. 
75 Section 174 of the SA Constitution; s 94(1) sentence 2 of the German Basic Law: “Half the members of 
the Federal Constitutional Court shall be elected by the Bundestag and half by the Bundesrat.” 
76 Bickel AM The least dangerous branch 2nd ed New Haven: Yale University Press (1986) at 16 seq. 
77 US Supreme Court, Marbury v Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  
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accurately than a more recent law. Finally, it is true that an excessive use of judicial 
review can interfere with the separation of powers.   
Given this background, it is necessary to examine how the material relationship 
between the values of democracy and fundamental rights is reflected in the institutional 
relationship between parliament and the constitutional court. Without much 
generalisation, the constitutional court78 is viewed as the institutional embodiment of 
the rule of law (and thus of fundamental rights) while parliament is the institutional 
representation of the majority (and thus democracy).   
4.1 Criticism: judicial overreach 
The institutional interplay between parliament and the constitutional court is not 
always problem free. As mentioned above, the counter-majoritarian dilemma remains a 
constant point of debate for constitutional scholars. In South Africa this debate has 
recently become more heated. The 2017 case Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of 
the National Assembly79 addressed the failure of the South African Parliament to hold 
the President accountable for his non-compliance with remedial action against him by 
the Public Protector. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Mogoeng warned that the 
majority judgement represented a “textbook case of judicial overreach – a 
constitutionally impermissible intrusion by the Judiciary into the exclusive domain of 
Parliament”.80 Even before this judgement, some South African politicians indicated 
their dissatisfaction with the rulings of the Constitutional Court, warning about 
“encroachment”,81 and the risk of a “judicial dictatorship”.82  
The same debate involving the German Federal Constitutional Court is developing 
in Germany.83 In recent years, the German Federal Constitutional Court has been 
increasingly criticised by legal scholars for the extensive exercise of its powers to the 
 
78 For the example of the German Federal Constitutional Court, see Schönberger C “Anmerkungen zu 
Karlsruhe” in Jestaedt M, Lepsius O, Möllers C & Schönberger C Das entgrenzte Gericht Berlin: Suhrkamp 
(2011) 9 at 50–56.  
79 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2018 (2) SA 571 (CC). See the case note 
by Parpworth (2017) at 273 seq. 
80 Mogoeng CJ in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2018 (2) SA 571 (CC) at 
para 223. 
81 Samson T “Executive Superior to Courts, says Zuma“ (2 November 2011) Business Day available at 
https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/business-day/20111102/282480000577522 (accessed 
24 September 2019).  
82 Du Plessis C “Nzimande slams ‘judicial dictatorship‘“ (18 December 2011) News 24 available at 
https://m.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Nzimande-slams-judicial-dictatorship-20111217-2 
(accessed 24 September 2019), see also Kawadza H “Attacks on the judiciary: undercurrents of a 
political versus legal constitutionalism dilemma ?“ (2018) 21(1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
(PER) at 7.  
83 See the dissenting opinions of Justices Lübbe-Wolff and Gerhardt, BVerfGE 134, 366 at 419 – 422 & 430. 
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alleged detriment of Parliament.84 This becomes apparent when legal scholars speak of 
the “unlimited court”85 or the “juristocracy”.86 This criticism of judicial overreach is not 
new.87 Rather, the relationship between constitutional jurisdiction and the legislature 
has been subject to debate since the phenomenon of strong review powers made its 
appearance in modern constitutional law.88 What is disconcerting is that this criticism 
seems to be increasing in frequency and intensity. Critics of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court go as far as to say that a substantial shift altering the structure of 
the Constitution, in particular the separation of powers, is taking place, to the detriment 
of the German Parliament and the principle of democracy.89 The following paragraphs 
will assess the accuracy of this broader attack on constitutional courts by self-styled 
democrats in the German context. 
4.2 The shift within the power structure 
Since Germany did not have a Constitutional Court under previous Constitutions, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court had no tradition or role model and had to find its 
own place in the institutional architecture of the State after the Basic Law entered into 
force in 1949. From the very beginning of its existence, it was the aim of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court to act and be recognised as a constitutional organ, of a 
status equivalent to that of Parliament and the executive.90 It has succeeded in doing so 
in an exemplary way. The Court has interpreted fundamental rights in a broad sense,91 
which gives it the opportunity to exercise broad review powers over the acts of other 
branches of government, especially the legislature. The German Federal Constitutional 
Court has created new aspects of fundamental rights, such as the duty to protect,92 and 
 
84 Pars pro toto . Jestaedt M, Lepsius O, Möllers C & Schönberger C Das entgrenzte Gericht Berlin: 
Suhrkamp (2011). 
85 Jestaedt et al (2011). 
86 Höffe O “Wer hütet die Verfassung vor ihren Hütern?” in Stolleis M (ed) Herzkammern der Republik 
Munich: CH Beck (2011) 124 at 127 & 135. See Brohm W “Die Funktion des BVerfG – Oligarchie in der 
Demokratie?” (2001) NJW 1 seq. 
87 See Simon H “Grundrechte im demokratischen und sozialen Rechtsstaat” in Gebauer K-E & Klein E (eds) 
Grundrechte, soziale Ordnung und Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit. Festschrift für Ernst Benda zum 70. 
Geburtstag Heidelberg: CF Müller (1995) 337 at 346. 
88 US Supreme Court, Marbury v Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803). In Germany, there was a controversy in the 
late 1920s as to whether the institution of a constitutional court was needed with main opponents 
Kelsen on the one hand (Kelsen H “Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit” (1929) 
Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer (VVDStRL) 5 at 30 seq; Kelsen H “Wer 
soll Hüter der Verfassung sein?” in van Ooyen R C (ed) Wer soll Hüter der Verfassung sein? Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck (2008) 58 seq) and Schmitt (1996) on the other. 
89 See dissenting opinions of Justices Lubbe-Wolf and Gerhardt, BVerfGE 134, 366 at 419-422 & 430;                             
Jestaedt  et al (2011) . 
90 BVerfG “Die Stellung des BVerfG” (1957) 6 Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart. Neue Folge 
(JöR NF) 144 seq. 
91 BVerfGE 6, 32 seq. 
92 BVerfGE 39, 1 seq. 
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has even distilled new unenumerated fundamental rights, such as, the right to 
informational self-determination,93 or the right to confidentiality and probity in 
information technology systems.94  
The Court has established the canon of Verfassungskonforme Auslegung or the 
principle that legislation must be interpreted as far as is reasonably possible in 
conformity with the Constitution (similar to the principle explicitly included in section 
39(2) of the South African Constitution),95 and the Court has set new requirements for 
the coherence of laws by ruling that new laws must “fit” without contradiction into 
existing sets of rules.96 Finally, the Court has even subjected to its control the power of 
the democratic legislature to pass constitutional amendments , by ruling that it falls 
within the Court’s competence to assess whether the requirements for constitutional 
amendments are met.97 The list could be extended at length. It is therefore true that the 
Court’s powers have grown significantly. At the same time the German legislature 
largely respects the role of the Court and is quite anxious to follow the Court’s existing 
case law.  
In isolated cases, however, the Court may have exceeded the limits of its powers. 
Even so, the stark criticism of some German scholars concerning judicial overreach 
seems to be exaggerated. The number of successful constitutional litigation cases is 
extremely low.98 The German Federal Constitutional Court very rarely invalidates Acts 
of Parliament. Thus, although the Court has found  ways to enable it to exercise strict 
review of Acts of Parliament, it seldom makes use of this power. The aforementioned 
criticism is, in my opinion, imbalanced for another reason. Critics only look at the 
rulings in which the German Federal Constitutional Court used its powers extensively. 
The opposite effect, the occasional lack of judicial review, is not taken into account. For 
example, sometimes it is the German Federal Constitutional Court that saves legislation 
by postulating the necessary justification for a law which the parliamentary debates did 
not reflect.  
Without sufficient justification, the law would otherwise have been considered 
unconstitutional.99 In fact, scholars are sometimes puzzled by the fact that the Court 
 
93 “Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung”, BVerfGE 65, 1 seq. 
94 “Grundrecht auf Gewährleistung der Vertraulichkeit und Integrität informationstechnischer Systeme”, 
BVerfGE 120, 274 seq. 
95 “Verfassungskonforme Auslegung”, BVerfGE 51, 304 seq. Section 39(1) provides that every court must 
interpret legislation in a manner that promotes “the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”.  
96 BVerfGE 98, 83 seq. 
97 BVerfGE 109, 279 seq. 
98 In the last 20 years on average only two per cent of the constitutional complaints pursuant to s 
93(1)(No. 4a) GG have been successful, BVerfG, “Jahresstatistik 2018” at 20 - 21, available at 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/DE/Verfahren/Jahresstatistiken/2018/statistik_2018_nod
e.html (accessed 15 August 2019). Furthermore, in many cases only the application of the law by the 
courts were unconstitutional but not necessarily the underlying piece of legislation. 
99 BVerfG (1998) NJW 1776 at 1777. See Sodan H “Verfassungsrechtsprechung im Wandel – am Beispiel 
der Berufsfreiheit” (2003) NJW 257 at 258. 
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does not review the legislative activity of parliament more strictly.100 These scholars 
argue that the Court could make better use of the essential content of a right,101 the 
requirement that the fundamental right effected by a law needs to be specified,102 or the 
requirement that a law must apply generally and not only to a single case.103 In short: a 
closer look at the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court reveals that 
much of the populist rhetoric about judicial overreach is overstated.   
4.3 Preliminary conclusion 
Where democracy and fundamental rights come into conflict, an independent 
Constitutional Court should resolve this conflict, since both the minority and the 
majority are partial and cannot rule in their own affairs. Therefore, modern 
constitutions provide, and rightly so, for constitutional courts with strong review 
powers. These courts are elected or appointed according to constitutionally or legally 
prescribed procedures and decide cases based on the constitution. Nevertheless, it is 
impossible to completely avoid the perennial problem of judicial overreach in a 
constitutional democracy based on the separation of powers, where the judicial power 
includes the power of judicial review. One has to accept the practical reality that the 
constitutional court is the highest authority in a constitutional democracy.  
Fundamental rights require interpretation and many interpretations are potentially 
acceptable within any given methodological framework. Placing new limitations on the 
review powers of constitutional courts, as discussed in Germany some years ago,104 and 
more recently introduced in Hungary and Poland, is no fruitful solution; at best these 
are manoeuvres of the ruling majority to prevent judicial review. Changing the powers 
of the constitutional court can serve as a dangerous precedent in the case of democratic 
backsliding. In such a scenario, a strong constitutional court with the power to review 
and, if necessary, invalidate an Act of Parliament, remains crucial. To avoid an unwanted 
judicial overreach, interfering with the separation of powers, judicial self-restraint 
appears to me to be the only promising remedy.  
 
100 Hillgruber C “Ohne rechtes Maß? Eine Kritik der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts nach 
60 Jahren” (2011) JuristenZeitung (JZ) 861 at 863 & 865 seq.  
101 “Wesensgehaltsgarantie” in s 19(2) of the German Basic Law: “In no case may the essence of a basic 
right be affected.” See Häberle P “Die Wesensgehaltsgarantie des Art. 19 Abs. 2” in Grundgesetz 3rd ed 
Heidelberg: CF Müller (1983). 
102 “Zitiergebot” in s 19(1) sentence 2 of the German Basic Law: “In addition, the law must specify the 
basic right affected and the Article in which it appears.” See Sodan H “Art 19” in Sodan H (ed) 
Grundgesetz 4rd ed Munich: CH Beck (2018) at  para 6. 
103 “Verbot des Einzelfallgesetzes” in s 19(1) sentence 1 of the German Basic Law: “Insofar as, under this 
Basic Law, a basic right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law, such law must apply generally and 
not merely to a single case.” See BVerfG 121, 30 seq.  
104 Müller F “Berliner Gedankenspiele zur dritten Gewalt” (3 April 2014) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(FAZ) available at https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/bundesverfassungsgericht-berliner-
gedankenspiele-zur-dritten-gewalt-12879093-p2.html (accessed 12 September 2019). 
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As a consequence, it is not the institution as such that needs legitimisation, but 
rather the way in which constitutional courts exercise their powers. The existence of a 
constitutional court does not have to be considered as a contradiction of democracy, as 
populists around the world are suggesting, but can be viewed as a deeply democratic 
institution, since it can ensure that fundamental rights as preconditions of democracy 
are protected. The constitutional courts are thus able to prevent a democratic backslide. 
One way of doing so is to attach greater importance to the largely neglected (Germany) 
and discarded (South Africa) doctrine of the minimum content of fundamental rights.  
5 THE MINIMUM CONTENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
One general task of legal research is to systemise the law, to work on a coherent legal 
system, and, especially in the case of constitutional scholars, to interpret the 
constitution and offer systematic solutions which can be used by the courts to give 
effect to the constitution.105 It is the duty of legal scholars to analyse constitutional 
provisions which are neglected, and underdeveloped to offer solutions to current legal 
problems. However, threats to the constitutional order should also be anticipated. As 
mentioned from the beginning of this essay, one of the most imminent dangers is 
democratic backsliding. The term “democratic backsliding” can be defined as “a 
deterioration of qualities associated with democratic governance, within any regime”.106 
This process is also referred to as democratic recession or democratic deconsolidation. 
Elected officials destroy democracy incrementally from within, and not from without 
through military power and coercion.107 Since the threat to democracy comes 
incrementally from within, there is the chance of other actors, such as a constitutional 
court,  countering this threat within the constitutional framework. 
In this regard, the constitutional courts have generally not been active enough to 
resist the rise of populist and majoritarian democracy. Contrary to the general criticism 
of judicial overreach, constitutional courts have to act on the problem of democratic 
backsliding and develop tools to prevent it. As stated above, democracy presupposes 
fundamental rights. Nevertheless, the mere existence of a Bill of Rights in itself is 
insufficient; there must be some substance to the rights, some minimum content. In my 
opinion, constitutional courts must develop a positive understanding of the constitution 
as a whole. With respect to the Bill of Rights, this means establishing a minimum 
content of the relevant rights that cannot be sacrificed without compromising the 
liberal democracy constitutional scheme in its entirety. Since courts review only single 
pieces of legislation at a time and decide whether it is compatible with the Bill of Rights, 
they have no tools to determine whether a democratic backsliding is occurring, and to 
stop it.  
 
105 Ipsen J “Grundzüge einer Grundrechtsdogmatik” (2013) 52 Der Staat 266 at 288. 
106 Waldner D & Lust E “Unwelcome change: coming to terms with democratic backsliding” (2018) 21 
Annual Review of Political Science 93 at 95. 
107 Levitsky S & Ziblatt D How democracies die New York: Crown (2017) at 3. 
 
  LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 23 (2019) 
 
Page | 318  
 
The answer lies in the guarantee of the essential content of a right as laid down in 
section 19(2) of the German Basic Law.108 This provision is to be understood as 
protecting the grant of fundamental rights in the sense that a substantial part of the 
fundamental right must remain intact at all costs. The core of the fundamental right is 
not available to balancing against countervailing interests but is granted in an absolute 
manner. 
It might be objected that the guarantee of the essential content of a right provides 
only limited protection, because both the individual fundamental right, as well as the 
guarantee of the essential content of a right, are subject to the actions of the legislature, 
which has the power to amend the constitution. Prima facie, this might appear to be 
true. However, a State that abolishes fundamental rights or the essential content of a 
right, moves itself from the concept of  a free and democratic basic order until 
ultimately the State cannot be considered as free or democratic. 
Although the South African Constitution has not adopted the “essential content” 
provision of the interim Constitution, legal scholars still debate the minimum core or 
essential content of some constitutional rights, especially with regard to socio-economic 
rights.109 The  SA Constitutional Court has also referred to the minimum content of 
rights, even after the entry into force of the final Constitution.110 A closer look at the 
German doctrine and the following methodological considerations when defining the 
essential content of a right, may therefore still be helpful within the South African 
context.   
 
5.1 The importance of determining the essential content of a right  
The guarantee of the essential content of a right has never played a major role in the 
jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court.111 Academia barely pays 
attention to this provision.112 In South Africa, the guarantee of the essential content of a 
right was enshrined in section 33(1)(b) of the South African interim Constitution but 
was not  incorporated in the SA Constitution.113 Therefore, one could question the utility 
of trying to establish the essential content of the fundamental rights. However, it is one 
of the very few constitutional provisions that applies in absolute terms and thus is not 
 
108 Section 19(2) of the German Basic Law, see Hillgruber (2011) at 863 & 865 seq. 
109 Botha H “Learning to live with plurality and dissent: the Grundgesetz in South Africa” in Häberle P 60 
Jahre deutsches Grundgesetz Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (2011) 409 at 424 – 425. 
110See for example Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission [2018] ZACC 8 2018 (4) SA 1 
(CC) 2018 (7), BCLR 763 (CC) at 45. 
111 Schaks N “Die Wesensgehaltsgarantie, Art 19 II GG” (2015) Juristische Schulung (JuS) 407 with further 
references. 
112 Schaks (2015)407 with further references.                          
113 Section 19(2) of the German Basic Law, see Hillgruber (2011) at 863 & 865 seq. 
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subject to the weighing of other factors. Rather, the right contains an objective core or 
substance which must be protected.114 
It is my view, that determining the essential content of a fundamental right will 
enable us to recognise the possible systematic abandonment of fundamental rights, as 
has happened in Russia, Turkey, Poland or Hungary, where governments are 
increasingly becoming, or have already became, authoritarian. Since democracy and 
fundamental rights are interrelated and interdependent, a democratic backsliding does 
not only affect democracy, but also fundamental rights. Only if the essential content of 
the rights is established in good time can the process of abandoning fundamental rights 
be identified and stopped. The concept of the essential content of a right is quite simple 
and originated during the period of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) in the late 1920s. 
It holds that if a fundamental right exists, even after limitations by the State, something 
of the fundamental right must remain that accords it its title as a fundamental right.115  
5.2 The threat of erosion 
Section 19(2) of the German Basic Law is intended to prevent the erosion of 
fundamental rights.116 In the academic debate, scholars discussed whether severe 
limitations, such as, lifelong imprisonment or the final and fatal shot fired by the police 
to save lives, would constitute an infringement of the guarantee of the essential content 
of the right to liberty and right to life.117 Similarly, the first time the South African 
Constitutional Court dealt with the essential content of a right under the interim 
Constitution was with regard to the constitutionality of the death penalty.118 The 
erosion that section 19(2) of the German Basic Law was intended to prevent cannot 
only be caused by serious individual violations, but also by less serious violations if they 
have the same effect cumulatively.119 Whether a fundamental right is undermined by 
one serious violation or by an accumulation of different violations can be manipulated 
arbitrarily by legislative techniques. The difference is immaterial when the outcome is 
 
114 See Schaks N “Das Verbot der Belastungskumulation als Bestandteil der Wesensgehaltsgarantie des 
Art. 19 Abs. 2 GG” (2015) DÖV 817 at 823 – 824. 
115 Hensel A in Anschütz G & Thoma R (eds) Handbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts  vol 2 Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck (1932) at 316. 
116 Leisner-Egensperger A “Wesensgehaltsgarantie” in Merten D & Papier H-J (eds) Handbuch der 
Grundrechte in Deutschland und Europa vol III Heidelberg: CF Müller (2009) at § 70 paras 1 - 3; Dreier 
H in Dreier H (ed) Grundgesetz vol I 3rd ed Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (2013) at Art 19 II paras 1 - 2; 
Huber P M in v Mangoldt H, Klein F & Starck C (eds) Grundgesetz vol I 7th ed Munich: CH Beck (2018) at 
Art 19 paras 110 - 112; Remmert B in Maunz T & Dürig G (eds) Grundgesetz at Art 19 Abs 2 paras 1, 18 
Munich: CH Beck (Lfg. 52, May 2008); Stern K Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vol III/2 
Munich: CH Beck (1994) at 841 seq, 864. See v Mangoldt H in Pikart E & Werner W (eds) Der 
Parlamentarische Rat 1948-1949 – Akten und Protokolle, Ausschuß für Grundsatzfragen vol 5/I Munich: 
Oldenbourg (1993) at 119. 
117 Schaks N (2015) at 409 – 410 with further references. 
118 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 132. 
119 See Ipsen J Staatsrecht II 21st ed Munich: Vahlen (2018) at paras 218 – 219; Schaks “ Das Verbot”  
(2015) at 821 with further references. 
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considered. Courts should thus stop focusing solely on the most extreme forms of 
limitation, such as, the aforementioned lifelong imprisonment or the final and fatal shot 
fired by the police to save lives, and rather focus on the dangers for fundamental rights 
caused by the cumulative effect of a series of seemingly harmless limitations.  
5.3 An example: the essential content of the freedom of expression 
In this part I will attempt to develop the essential content of freedom of expression. 
Freedom of expression is “a basic requirement of any free and democratic society”, 
because “this freedom allows a continual intellectual exchange and a battle of opinions, 
which is the life-giving element of any free and democratic society”.120 Consequently, 
this freedom is particularly suited when one tries to establish the minimum content of a 
fundamental right in order to prevent a democratic backslide. 
5.3.1 The essential content of all fundamental rights  
All fundamental rights set out in German and South African constitutional law are 
binding legal provisions.121 This is the defining aspect of all fundamental rights, 
including freedom of expression, as they have developed throughout history. Thus, 
the essential content of each individual fundamental right can be characterised as 
an individual right that is orientated towards the State and that can be exercised 
against the State. This incorporates “effective means of protection” which includes 
the possibility to successfully challenge in court limitations to one’s fundamental 
rights.122   
 
5.3.2 The essential content of freedom of expression 
To answer the question of whether the essential content of freedom of expression123 has 
been infringed, it is my submission that qualitative124 and quantitative125 aspects of the 
freedom of expression must be taken into consideration. The requirement that the 
essential content of the fundamental right be provided for qualitatively can be derived 
from the term “essential”. Essence (essential) describes that which characterises the 
fundamental right. In addition, section 19(2) of the German Basic Law contains a 
quantitative aspect. A sufficiently significant part or enough of what constitutes the 
 
120 BVerfGE 7, 198 at 208. 
121 This is expressly stated in s 1(3) of the German Basic Law: “The following basic rights shall bind the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.” 
122 BVerfGE 61, 82 at 113; Huber  (2018) at Art 19 para 154 seq. 
123 Section 5(1) sentence 1 var. 1 of the German Basic Law: “Every person shall have the right freely to 
express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures […].” 
124 Section 5.3.2.1  
125 Section 5.3.2.2 
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essence of a fundamental right must remain; anything else constitutes infringement.126 
This is the same way in which the South African Constitutional Court interpreted the 
essential content under the interim Constitution.127 The term “content” is generally used 
to refer to “substance”, “purport” and similar terms, which imply that a significant part 
must not be infringed. 
Insofar as  the qualitative dimension is concerned, the formulation of a fundamental 
right (including any internal limitations) gives us important information about the core 
of the right. In addition, it is significant to look at the historical dangers that gave rise to 
the formulation of a fundamental right. One example is the express ban of censorship.128 
From the historical background, we can conclude that it was especially important to the 
drafters of the German Constitution that no censorship be allowed. This was in reaction 
to a particularly severe historical danger. Section 143 of the German “Paulskirche 
Constitution”, drafted in 1849 but never entered into force, is an early document 
expressly forbidding censorship. This was considered of vital importance after the 
resolutions passed in Karlsbad in 1819 which limited the free expression of opinion to 
the point of repression, entirely changing the political climate of the time .  
The German Constitution of Weimar (1919)129 also included an express ban on 
censorship in section 118(2) sentence 1.130 To prevent individuals from censoring 
themselves in anticipation of repressive measures, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court requires that the principle of free speech must be applied even to the 
interpretation of an allegedly defamatory statement.131 This means that the courts, 
before convicting a person, must interpret the statement carefully. Only if there is no 
single interpretation that could be regarded as legal, may the court convict a person 
because of his or her statement.132 
The German Federal Constitutional Court ruled early on that the freedom of 
expression “is one of the most direct expressions of a human personality within a 
society”.133 This is because this freedom allows “a continual intellectual exchange, a 
battle of opinions”.134 From this we may conclude that only intellectual debate is 
protected; freedom of expression does not make reference to other forms or methods, 
such as economic power. In the newsstand case, for example, the Court held that a 
 
126 Stern K (1994) at 847 & 864; Krüger H “Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte i. S. des Art 19 GG” (1955) 
DÖV 597 at 599. 
127 Makwanyane 1995(3) SA 391 (CC) at para 134.  
128 Section 5(1) sentence 3 of the German Basic Law: “There shall be no censorship.” 
129 11 August 1919, RGBl. 1919 p1383. 
130 “Censorship does not take place, but for light shows deviating regulations can be made by law.” 
131 For example in case of criminal convictions for libel or defamation. 
132 BVerfGE 82, 43 at 51 seq.; BVerfGE 93, 266 at 295 – 296. 
133 BVerfGE 7, 198 at 208. 
134 BVerfGE 7, 198 at 208. In a similar way, the South African Constitutional Court stresses that freedom of 
expression protects the “free and open exchange of ideas”, S v Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) at para 
37. 
 
  LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 23 (2019) 
 
Page | 322  
 
dominant publishing house may not use its economic power to force a small, privately 
run newsstand to boycott certain newspapers with controversial content.135 The 
publishing house tried to use its economic power to ban other newspapers for their pro-
communist opinions. The German Federal Constitutional Court held that the publishing 
house could not invoke freedom of expression if it merely tries to force the newsstand 
by economic means to change its view.136  
The limitations placed on fundamental rights also contain information about the 
essence of a fundamental right: from the specific requirement for limitations of freedom 
of expression that only “general laws” may limit freedom of expression,137 we can 
conclude that the content of a particular opinion lies at the core of the protected right, 
because no particular opinions may be forbidden.138 The German Federal Constitutional 
Court interprets the aforementioned term “general laws” in the sense that they must not 
be directed against a certain opinion as such and that the mere holding of a certain 
opinion cannot be forbidden.139 Because the content is more important that the form, 
requirements of moderation which apply only to the form (and not to the content) of 
the expression of opinion, do not represent an infringement of the essential content, as 
defined by the German Basic Law. Furthermore, since section 5(2) of the German Basic 
Law allows limitations for the protection of minors and for the protection of personal 
honour, opinions interfering with the protection of minors or  personal honour may fall 
within the scope of freedom of expression. However, these opinions do not constitute 
the essential content of freedom of expression, because the German Basic Law facilitates 
their limitations. 
After all the infringements have been taken into account, a quantitative view must 
be taken to establish whether the bearer of the right still has a sufficient part of the right 
remaining.140 To determine this, all limitations on freedom of expression must be taken 
into account. Although it is not possible to compile a comprehensive list here, an 
attempt may be made to evaluate limitations of a right. The more the content of an 
opinion is concerned (what is expressed as opposed to the manner in which an opinion 
is expressed), the more likely it is that the guarantee of the essential content of freedom 
of expression is negated. 
 
135 BVerfGE 25, 256 at 264–266. 
136 BVerfGE 25, 256 at 264–266. 
137 Section 5(2) of the German Basic Law. This clause applies only in the case of restrictions to freedom of 
expression and is an additional safeguard to the generally applicable ss 3(1) and 19(1) sentence 1 of 
the German Basic Law which state that all limitations must apply generally and not merely to a single 
case, and that all persons shall be equal before the law. 
138 See BVerfGE 124, 300 seq; Schaefer J P “Wie viel Freiheit für die Gegner der Freiheit?” (2010) DÖV 379 
seq; Volkmann U “Die Geistesfreiheit und der Ungeist – Der Wunsiedel-Beschluss des BVerfG” (2010) 
NJW 417 seq. 
139 BVerfGE 124, 300 at 321 – 325. 
140 Schaks N “Das Verbot der Belastungskumulation als Bestandteil der Wesensgehaltsgarantie des Art. 19 
Abs. 2 GG” (2015) DÖV 817 at 823 – 824. 
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Determining the essential content of a fundamental right, and whether it is 
infringed, forces academia to consider all limitations on a fundamental right that exist 
thus far. This helps scholars to clearly determine how much freedom exists, and where 
it has been sacrificed.  
5.4 Preliminary Conclusion  
The minimum fundamental rights and freedoms that must exist if a State is to be 
considered democratic are provided for and ensured by law. Section 19(2) of the 
German Basic Law includes the guarantee of the essential content of a right, which 
states that a substantive core of each fundamental right granted may not be infringed. 
With regard to freedom of expression, this means protection of the right to free speech, 
which is to be understood as the right to express one’s own human personality without 
censorship and as a means of peaceful intellectual debate.  
6 CONCLUSION 
Democracy presupposes fundamental rights. At the same time democracy is best suited 
to protect fundamental rights. Democracy and fundamental rights are interdependent 
and interrelated without a fixed hierarchy between the two values. Where the two 
values come into conflict, they need to be balanced. The interdependence between 
democracy and fundamental rights is also reflected in the institutional relationship 
between parliament and constitutional courts. Both institutions are bound by both 
principles and have to satisfy both principles within the boundaries of their 
constitutional competences. Under modern constitutions with a system of separation of 
powers, such as, the South African Constitution or the German Basic Law, the 
constitutional court ultimately strikes the balance. The constitutional court can further 
invalidate Acts of parliament. This is not undemocratic per se, because the protection of 
the minority is part of the democratic principle. Even though constitutional courts 
sometimes do overreach, there is no empirical evidence of a constant judicial overreach 
that is contrary to the separation of powers. In order to prevent a transgression of 
constitutional courts into the powers of the legislative body, only the self-definition and 
self-limitation of the constitutional court, accompanied by the critical attention of legal 
scholarship, seem to be viable options.  
However, a bigger threat to democracy than a judicial overreach are the dangers of 
a democratic backslide. However, constitutional jurisprudence is not well-developed to 
recognise and counter democratic backslides. Constitutional courts have to develop and 
implement tools to prevent such backslides, which are today a risk in both developing 
and established democracies. It is suggested that such democratic backslides can only 
be halted when rights are interpreted to have a core or essential content. When the 
essential content of a right is examined, both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of 
a right are at stake. I illustrated above how the core content of a right can be derived 
using the freedom of expression. The essential content of the other fundamental rights 
remains to be defined. This task may be burdensome, but it has become essential if 
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constitutional scholars are to detect potentially fatal attempts to terminate the 
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